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Abstract. In the stable marriage problem, a set of men and a set of
women are given, each of whom has a strictly ordered preference list
over the acceptable agents in the opposite class. A matching is called
stable if it is not blocked by any pair of agents, who mutually prefer
each other to their respective partner. Ties in the preferences allow for
three different definitions for a stable matching: weak, strong and super-
stability. Besides this, acceptable pairs in the instance can be restricted
in their ability of blocking a matching or being part of it, which again
generates three categories of restrictions on acceptable pairs. Forced pairs
must be in a stable matching, forbidden pairs must not appear in it, and
lastly, free pairs cannot block any matching.
Our computational complexity study targets the existence of a stable
solution for each of the three stability definitions, in the presence of each
of the three types of restricted pairs. We solve all cases that were still
open. As a byproduct, we also derive that the maximum size weakly
stable matching problem is hard even in very dense graphs, which may
be of independent interest.
1 Introduction
In the classical stable marriage problem (sm) [8], a bipartite graph is given,
where one side symbolizes a set of men U , while the other side symbolizes a
set of women W . Man u and woman w are connected by edge uw if they find
one another mutually acceptable. In the most basic setting, each participant
provides a strictly ordered preference list of the acceptable agents of the opposite
gender. An edge uw blocks matching M if it is not in M , but each of u and w is
either unmatched or prefers the other to their respective partner in M . A stable
matching is a matching not blocked by any edge. From the seminal paper of
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Gale and Shapley [8], we know that the existence of such a stable solution is
guaranteed and one can be found in linear time.
Several real-world applications [2] require a relaxation of the strict order to
weak order, or, in other words, preference lists with ties, leading to the stable
marriage problem with ties (smt) [10, 12, 18]. When ties occur, the definition of
a blocking edge needs to be revisited. In the literature, three intuitive definitions
are used, namely weakly, strongly and super-stable matchings [10]. According to
weak stability, a matching is weakly blocked by an edge uw if agents u and w both
strictly prefer one another to their partners in the matching. A strongly blocking
edge is preferred strictly by one end vertex, whereas it is not strictly worse than
the matching edge at the other end vertex. A super-blocking edge is at least as
good as the matching edge for both end vertices in the super-stable case. Super-
stable matchings are strongly stable and strongly stable matchings are weakly
stable by definition, because weakly blocking edges are strongly blocking, and
strongly blocking edges are super-blocking at the same time.
Another classical direction of research is to distinguish some of the edges
based on their ability to be part of or to block a matching. Table 1 provides a
structured overview of the three sorts of restricted edges that have been defined
in earlier papers [14, 5, 6, 1, 16, 4]. The mechanism designer has the right to
specify three sets of restricted edges: forced edges must be in the output match-
ing, forbidden edges must not appear in it, and finally, free edges cannot block
the matching, no matter the preference ordering.
uw must be in M uw can be in M uw must not be in M
uw can block M forced unrestricted forbidden
uw cannot block M forced free irrelevant
Table 1. The three types of restricted edges are marked with bold letters. The columns
tells edge uw’s role regarding being in a matching, while the rows split cases based on
uw’s ability to block a matching.
In this paper, we combine weakly ordered lists and restricted edges, and
determine the computational complexity of finding a stable matching in all cases
not solved yet.
1.1 Literature review
We first focus on the known results for the smt problem without restricted
edges, and then switch to the sm problem with edge restrictions. Finally, we list
all progress up to our paper in smt with restricted edges.
Ties. If all edges are unrestricted, a weakly stable matching always exists, be-
cause generating any linear extension to each preference list results in a classical
sm instance, which admits a solution [8]. This solution remains stable in the
original instance as well. On the other hand, strong and super-stable matchings
are not guaranteed to exist. However, there are polynomial-time algorithms to
output a strongly/super-stable matching or a proof for its nonexistence [10, 19].
Restricted edges. Dias et al. [5] showed that the problem of finding a stable
matching in a sm instance with forced and forbidden edges or reporting that
none exists is solvable in O(m) time, where m is the number of edges in the in-
stance. Approximation algorithms for instances not admitting any stable match-
ing including all forced and avoiding all forbidden edges were studied in [4]. The
existence of free edges can only enlarge the set of stable solutions, thus a stable
matching with free edges always exists. However, in the presence of free edges,
a maximum-cardinality stable matching is NP-hard to find [1]. Kwanashie [16,
Sections 4 and 5] performed an exhaustive study on various stable matching
problems with free edges. The term “stable with free edges” [3, 7] is equivalent
to “socially stable” [1, 16].
Ties and restricted edges. Table 2 illustrates the known and our new results
on problems that arise when ties and restricted edges are combined in an in-
stance. Weakly stable matchings in the presence of forbidden edges were studied
by Scott [24], where the author shows that deciding whether a matching exists
avoiding the set of forbidden edges is NP-complete. A similar hardness result was
derived by Manlove et al. [20] for the case of forced edges, even if the instance
has a single forced edge. Forced and forbidden edges in super-stable matchings
were studied by Fleiner et al. [6], who gave a polynomial-time algorithm to de-
cide whether a stable solution exists. Strong stability in the presence of forced
and forbidden edges is covered by Kunysz [15], who gave a polynomial-time al-
gorithm for the weighted strongly stable matching problem with non-negative
edge weights. Since strongly stable matchings are always of the same cardinal-
ity [17, 12], a stable solution or a proof for its nonexistence can be found via
setting the edge weights to 0 for forbidden edges, 2 for forced edges, and 1 for
unrestricted edges.
1.2 Our contributions
In Section 3 we prove a stronger result than the hardness proof in [24] delivers:
we show that finding a weakly stable matching in the presence of forbidden edges
is NP-complete even if the instance has a single forbidden edge.
As a byproduct, we gain insight into the well-known maximum size weakly
stable matching (without any edge restriction). This problem is known to be
NP-complete [13, 20], even if preference lists are of length at most three [11, 21].
On the other hand, if the graph is complete, a complete weakly stable matching
is guaranteed to exist. It turns out that this completeness is absolutely crucial to
keep the problem tractable: as we show here, if the graph is a complete bipartite
graph missing exactly one edge, then deciding whether a perfect weakly stable
matching exists is NP-complete.
We turn to the problem of free edges under strong and super-stability in Sec-
tion 4. We show that deciding whether a strongly/super-stable exists when free
edges occur in the instance is NP-complete. This hardness is in sharp contrast to
the polynomial-time algorithms for the weighted strongly/ super-stable match-
ing problems. Afterwards, we show that deciding the existence of a strongly or
super-stable matching in an instance with free edges is fixed-parameter tractable
parameterized by the number of free edges.
Existence weak strong super
forbidden NP-complete [24] even if |P | = 1 O(nm) [15] O(m) [6]
forced NP-complete even if |Q| = 1 [20] O(nm) [15] O(m) [6]
free always exists NP-complete NP-complete
Table 2. Previous and our results summarized in a table. The contribution of this
paper is marked by bold gray font. The instance has n vertices, m edges, |P | forbidden
edges, and |Q| forced edges.
2 Preliminaries
The input of the stable marriage problem with ties consists of a bipartite graph
G = (U ∪W,E) and for each v ∈ U ∪W , a weakly ordered preference list Ov of
the edges incident to v. We denote the number of vertices in G by n, while m
stands for the number of edges. An edge connecting vertices u and w is denoted
by uw. We say that the preference lists in an instance are derived from a master
list if there is a weak order O of U ∪W so that each Ov where v ∈ U ∪W can
be obtained by deleting entries from O.
The set of restricted edges consists of the set of forbidden edges P , the set of
forced edges Q, and the set of free edges F . These three sets are disjoint.
Definition 1. A matching M is weakly/strongly/super-stable with restricted
edges P,Q, and F , if M ∩ P = ∅, Q ⊆M , and the set of edges blocking M in a
weakly/strongly/super sense is a subset of F .
3 Weak stability
In Theorem 1 we present a hardness proof for the weakly stable matching prob-
lem with a single forbidden edge, even if this edge is ranked last by both end
vertices. The hardness of the maximum-cardinality weakly stable matching prob-
lem in dense graphs (Theorem 2) follows easily from this result.
Problem 1 smt-forbidden-1
Input: A complete bipartite graph G = (U ∪W,E), a forbidden edge P = {uw}
and preference lists with ties.
Question: Does there exist a weakly stable matching M so that uw /∈M?
Theorem 1. smt-forbidden-1 is NP-complete, even if all ties are of length
two, they appear only on one side of the bipartition and at the beginning of the
complete preference lists, and the forbidden edge is ranked last by both its end
vertices.
Proof. smt-forbidden-1 is clearly in NP, as any matching can be checked for
stability in linear time.
We reduce from the perfect-smti problem defined below, which is known
to be NP-complete even if all ties are of length two, and appear on one side of
the bipartition and at the beginning of the preference lists, as shown by Manlove
et al. [20].
Problem 2 perfect-smti
Input: An incomplete bipartite graph G = (U ∪W,E), and preference lists with
ties.
Question: Does there exist a perfect weakly stable matching M?
Construction. To each instance I of perfect-smti, we construct an instance
I ′ of smt-forbidden-1.
LetG = (U∪W,E) be the underlying graph in instance I. When constructing
G′ for I ′, we add two men u1 and u2 to U , and two women w1 and w2 to W . On
vertex classes U ′ = U ∪ {u1, u2} and W ′ =W ∪ {w1, w2}, G′ will be a complete
bipartite graph. As the list below shows, we start with the original edge set E(G)
in stage 0, and then add the remaining edges in four further stages. An example
for the built graph is shown in Figure 1.
0. E(G)
We keep the edges in E(G) and also preserve the vertices’ rankings on them.
These edges are solid black in Figure 1.
1. (U × {w1}) ∪ ({u1} ×W )
We first connect u1 to all women in W , and w1 to all men in U . Man u1
(woman w1) ranks the women from W (men from U) in an arbitrary order.
Each u ∈ U (w ∈ W ) ranks w1 (u1) after all their edges in E(G). These
edges are loosely dashed green in Figure 1.
2. (U ×W ) \ E(G)
Now we add for each pair (u,w) ∈ U ×W with uw /∈ E(G) the edge uw,
where u (w) ranks w (u) even after w1 (u1). These edges are densely dashed
blue in Figure 1.
3.
[
(U ∪ {u1})× {w2}
]
∪
[
{u2} × (W ∪ {w1})
]
Man u2 is connected to all women fromW ∪{w1}, and ranks all these women
in an arbitrary order. The women from W ∪ {w1} rank u2 worse than any
already added edge. Similarly, w2 is connected to all men fromM∪{u1}, and
ranks all these men in an arbitrary order. The men from M ∪ {u1} rank w2
worse than any already added edge. These edges are dotted red in Figure 1.
4. u1w1 and u2w2
Finally, we add the edges u1w1 and u2w2, which are ranked last by both of
their end vertices. Edge u2w2 is the only forbidden edge and it is the violet
zigzag edge in Figure 1, while u2w2 is wavy gray.
u1 u2
w1 w2 0. E(G)
1. (U × {w1}) ∪ ({u1} ×W )
2. (U ×W ) \ E(G)
3.
[
(U ∪ {u1})× {w2}
]
3. ∪
[
{u2} × (W ∪ {w1})
]
4. {u1, w1}
4. {u2, w2} (forbidden)
Fig. 1. An example for the reduction. The legend on the right side lists the five groups
of edges in the preference order at all vertices. The edges from the perfect-smti
instance (drawn in solid black) keep their ranks. Every vertex ranks solid black edges
best, then loosely dashed green edges, then densely dashed blue edges, then dotted red
edges, then the wavy gray edge {u1, w1} and the forbidden violet zigzag edge {uw, w2}.
Claim: I admits a perfect stable matching if and only if I ′ admits a stable
matching not containing u2w2.
(⇒) Let M be a perfect stable matching in I. We construct M ′ as M ∪
{u1w2} ∪ {u2w1}. Clearly, M ′ is a matching not containing the forbidden edge
u2w2, so it only remains to show thatM
′ is stable. We do this by case distinction
on a possible blocking edge.
0. E(G)
Since M does not admit a blocking edge in I, no edge from the original
E(G) can block M ′ in I ′.
1. (U × {w1}) ∪ ({u1} ×W )
All vertices in U ∪W rank these edges lower than their edges in M ′.
2. (U ×W ) \ E(G)
Edges in this set cannot block M ′ because they are ranked worse than edges
in M ′ by both of their end vertices.
3.
[
(U ∪ {u1})× {w2}
]
∪
[
(W ∪ {w1})× {u2}
]
Vertices in U ∪W prefer their edge in M ′ to all edges in this set. Since they
are in M ′, u1w2 and u2w1 also cannot block M
′.
4. u1w1 and u2w2
These two edges are strictly worse than u1w2 ∈ M ′ and u2w1 ∈ M ′ at all
four end vertices.
(⇐) Let M ′ be a stable matching in I ′ and u2w2 /∈ M ′. Since G′ is a com-
plete bipartite graph with the same number of vertices on both sides, M ′ is a
perfect matching. In particular, u2 and w2 are matched by M
′, say to w and u,
respectively. Since M ′ does not contain the forbidden edge u2w2, we have that
u 6= u2 and w 6= w2. Then we have w = w1 and u = u1, as uw blocks M ′
otherwise.
If M ′ contains an edge uw /∈ E(G) with u ∈ U and w ∈W , then this implies
that uw1 is a blocking edge. Thus, M := M
′ \ {u1w2, u2w1} ⊆ E(G), i.e. it
is a perfect matching in G. This M is also stable, as any blocking edge in G
immediately implies a blocking edge for M ′, which contradicts our assumption
on M ′ being a stable matching.
As a byproduct, we get that max-smti-dense, the problem of deciding
whether an almost complete bipartite graph admits a perfect weakly stable
matching, is also NP-complete.
Problem 3 max-smti-dense
Input: A bipartite graph G = (U∪W,E), where E(G) = Kn,n\{e} and preference
lists with ties.
Question: Does there exist a perfect weakly stable matching M?
Theorem 2. max-smti-dense is NP-complete, even if all ties are of length two,
are on one side of the bipartition, and appear at the beginning of the preference
lists.
Proof. max-smti-dense is in NP, as a matching can be checked for stability in
linear time.
We reduce from smt-forbidden-1. By Theorem 1, this problem is even NP-
complete if the forbidden edge uw is at the end of the preference lists of u and w.
For each such instance I of smt-forbidden-1, we construct an instance I ′ of
max-smti-dense by deleting the forbidden edge uw.
Claim: The instance I admits a stable matching if and only if I ′ admits a
perfect stable matching.
(⇒) LetM be a stable matching for I. As smt-forbidden-1 gets a complete
bipartite graph as an input, M is a perfect matching. Since M does not contain
the edge uw, it is also a matching in I ′. Moreover,M is stable there, because the
transformation only removed a possible blocking edge and added none of these.
(⇐) Let M ′ be a perfect stable matching in I ′. Since uw is at the end of the
preference lists of u and w, and M ′ is perfect, uw cannot block M ′. Thus, M ′ is
stable in I.
Having shown a hardness result for the existence of a weakly stable matching
even in very restricted instances with a single forbidden edge in Theorem 1, we
now turn our attention to strongly and super-stable matchings.
4 Strong and super-stability
As already mentioned in Section 1.1, strongly and super-stable matchings can
be found in polynomial time if forced and forbidden edges both occur in the
instance [6, 15]. Thus we consider the case of free edges, and in Theorem 3 and
Proposition 1 we show hardness for the strong and super-stable matching prob-
lems in instances with free edges. The same construction suits both cases. Then,
in Proposition 2 we remark that both problems are fixed-parameter tractable
with |F | as the parameter.
Problem 4 ssmti-free
Input: A bipartite graph G = (U∪W,E), a set F ⊆ E of free edges, and preference
lists with ties.
Question: Does there exist a matching M so that uw ∈ F for all uw ∈ E that
blocks M in the strongly/super-stable sense?
In ssmti-free, we define two problem variants simultaneously, because all
our upcoming proofs are identical for both of these problems. For the super-
stable marriage problem with ties and free edges, all super-blocking edges must
be in F , while for the strongly stable marriage problem with ties and free edges,
it is sufficient if a subset of these, the strongly blocking edges, are in F .
Theorem 3. ssmti-free is NP-complete even in graphs with maximum degree
four, and if preference lists of women are derived from a master list.
Proof. ssmti-free is clearly in NP because the set of edges blocking a matching
can be determined in linear time.
We reduce from the 1-in-3 positive 3-sat problem, defined below, which is
known to be NP-complete [23, 9, 22].
Problem 5 1-in-3 positive 3-sat
Input: A 3-SAT formula, in which no literal is negated and every variable occurs
in at most three clauses.
Question: Does there exist a satisfying truth assignment that sets exactly one
literal in each clause to be true?
Construction. To each instance I of 1-in-3 positive 3-sat, we construct an
instance I ′ of ssmti-free.
Let x1, . . . , xn be the variables and C1, . . . , Cm be the clauses of the 1-in-3
positive 3-sat instance I. For each clause Ci, we add a clause gadget consisting
of three vertices ai, bi, and ci, where bi is connected to ai and ci, as shown in
Figure 2. While vertices ai and bi do not have any further edge, ci will be incident
to three interconnecting edges leading to variable gadgets. Vertex bi is ranked
first by ai and last by ci, and these two vertices are placed in a tie by bi.
For each variable xi, occurring in the three clauses Ci1 , Ci2 , and Ci3 , we add
a variable gadget with nine vertices yji , z
j
i , and w
j
i for j ∈ [3], as indicated in
Figure 3. Each vertex zji is connected only to y
j
i by a free edge, and these are
the only free edges in our construction. For each (ℓ, j) ∈ [3]2, we add an edge
wℓiy
j
i , which is ranked second (after z
j
i ) by y
j
i . The vertex w
ℓ
i ranks this edge at
position one if ℓ = j and else at position two. Finally, we connect the vertex wℓi
to the vertex ciℓ by an interconnecting edge, ranked at position one by ciℓ and
position three by wℓi .
The resulting instance is bipartite: U = {zji , w
j
i , bi} is the set of men and
W = {yji , ci, ai} is the set of women. One easily sees that the maximum degree
in our reduction is four.
Note that the preference lists of the women in the ssmti-free instance are
derived from a master list. The master list for the women W = {yji , ci, ai} is the
ai
bi
ci
1
1 1
2
x2
1
x1
2
x1
3
3
1
3
1
3
1
Fig. 2. An example of a clause gadget for the clause Ci, containing the variables x1,
x4, and x5. The interconnecting edges are dashed and gray.
following. At the top are all vertices of the form {zji } in a single tie, followed by
all vertices of the form {wji } in a single tie, and finally, all other vertices ({bi})
at the bottom of the preference list.
Claim: I is a YES-instance if and only if I ′ admits a strongly/super-stable
matching.
(⇒) Let T be a satisfying truth assignment such that for each clause, exactly
one literal is true. For each true variable xi in this assignment, let M contain
the edges wℓiciℓ and y
ℓ
iz
ℓ
i for each ℓ ∈ [3]. For all other variables, let M contain
wℓiy
ℓ
i for each ℓ ∈ [3]. For each clause Ci, add the edge aibi to M .
Following these rules, we have constructed a matching. It remains to check
that M is super-stable (and thus also strongly stable). Since ai is matched to its
only neighbor, it cannot be part of a blocking edge. Since each ci is matched along
an interconnecting edge, which is better than bi, no blocking edge involves bi.
A blocking interconnecting edge ciw
ℓ
j implies that w
ℓ
j is not matched to any y
ℓ
j ,
however this is only true if ciw
ℓ
j ∈ M . A blocking edge w
ℓ
iy
j
i does not appear.
Either wℓi is matched to its unique first choice y
ℓ
i and therefore not part of a
blocking edge, or yji is matched to its unique first choice z
j
i , and thus, y
j
i is not
part of a blocking edge.
(⇐) LetM be a strongly stable matching (note that any super-stable match-
ing is also strongly-stable). Then M contains the edge aibi, and ci is matched
to a vertex wℓj for all i ∈ [m], as else cibi or aibi block M . If w
ℓ
jci ∈ M , then
yaj z
a
j ∈ M for all a ∈ [3], as else w
ℓ
jy
a
j would be a blocking edge. This, however,
implies that waj cja ∈M for all a ∈ [3], as else w
a
j cja would be a blocking edge.
Thus, for each variable xi, the matching M contains either all edges w
ℓ
iciℓ
for ℓ ∈ [3] or none of these edges. Thus, the variables xi such that M contains
wℓi ciℓ for ℓ ∈ [3] induce a truth assignment such that for each clause, exactly one
literal is true.
y1i
z1i
w1i
y2i
z2i
w2i
y3i
z3i
w3i
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
c1 c3 c5
3
1
3
1
3
1
Fig. 3. An example of a variable gadget for the variable xi occurring, where xi occurs
exactly in the clauses C1, C3, and C5. Free edges are marked by wavy lines, while
interconnecting edges are dashed and gray.
This proof aimed at the hardness of the restricted case, in which the under-
lying graph has a low maximum degree. For the sake of completeness, we add
another variant, which is defined in a complete bipartite graph.
Proposition 1. ssmti-free is NP-complete, even in complete bipartite graphs,
where each tie has length at most three.
Proof. We reduce from ssmti-free. Given a ssmti-free instance on graph G,
we add all non-present edges between men and women as free edges, ranked
worse than any edge from E(G). We call the resulting graph H .
Clearly, a strongly/super-stable matching in G is also strongly/super-stable
in H , as we only added free edges.
Vice versa, let M be a strongly/super-stable matching in H . Let M ′ :=
M ∩ E(G) arise from M by deleting all edges not in E(G). Then M ′ clearly is
a matching in G, so it remains to show that M ′ is strongly/super-stable.
Assume that there is a blocking edge uw in, G, in the strongly/super-stable
sense. Since uw is not blocking in H , at least one of u and w has to be matched
in H , but not in G. However, this vertex prefers uw also to its partner in H ,
and thus, uw is also blocking in H , which is a contradiction.
Note that ssmti-free becomes polynomial-time solvable if only a constant
number of edges is free in the same way as max-ssmi, the problem of finding a
maximum-cardinality stable matching with strict lists and free edges [1].
Proposition 2. SSMTI-Free can be solved in O(2knm) time in the strongly sta-
ble case, and in O(2km) time in the super-stable case, where k := |F | is the
number of free edges.
Proof. For each subset Q ⊆ F of free edges, we construct an instance of ssmti-
forced as follows. Mark all edges in Q as forced, and delete all other free edges.
If any of the ssmti-forced instances admits a stable matching, then this is
clearly a stable matching in the ssmti-free instance, as only free edges were
deleted. Vice versa, any solution M for the ssmti-free instance containing
exactly the set of forced edges Q (i.e. Q =M∩F ) immediately implies a solution
for the ssmti-forced instance with forced edges Q.
Clearly, there are 2k subsets of F . Since any instance of ssmti-forced can
be solved in O(nm) time in the strongly stable case [6] and in O(m) time in the
super-stable case [15], the running time follows.
5 Conclusion
Studying the stable marriage problem with ties combined with restricted edges,
we have shown three NP-completeness results. Our computational hardness re-
sults naturally lead to the question whether imposing master lists on both
sides makes the problems easier to solve. Moreover, it is open whether smt-
forbidden-1 remains hard in bounded-degree graphs. In addition, one may try
to identify relevant parameters for our problems and then decide whether they
are fixed-parameter tractable or admit a polynomial-sized kernel with respect to
these parameters.
Acknowledgments. The authors thank David Manlove and Rolf Niedermeier for
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